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PUTTING GUANTANAMO IN THE REAR­
VIEW MIRROR: THE POLITICAL
 
ECONOMY OF DETENTION POLICY
 
PETER MARGULIES* 
INTRODUCTION 
Guantanamo is a little bit like Humpty Dumpty in reverse.  It 
was alarmingly easy for the Bush administration to put together and 
has proven very difficult to take apart.  At its core, however, closing 
Guantanamo resembles other examples of facility siting, in which 
the government determines where to put uses that trigger fear or 
mistrust.1  Siting disputes turn on three factors: efficiency, equity, 
and accuracy.  President Obama’s initial announcement that he 
planned to close Guantanamo within one year2 triggered congres­
sional opposition.  Congress took the announcement as a signal that 
the President had not adequately considered the interaction of 
these three elements.3  However, the President’s recent efforts fo­
cus more closely on these factors.4  Because of this improved signal­
ing, the President’s program will be productive, even though 
meeting the one-year deadline has proven to be impossible. 
This piece first defines efficiency, equity, and accuracy.  Effi­
ciency refers to the ease with which the government achieves a goal. 
President Obama’s efforts to close Guantanamo reframed effi­
ciency to entail not just catching suspected terrorists but also 
regaining the goodwill that the United States had lost during the 
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University.  I thank Brad Berenson, John 
Parry, and Sudha Setty for comments on a previous draft. 
1. See Peter Margulies, Building Communities of Virtue: Political Theory, Land 
Use Policy, and the “Not in My Backyard” Syndrome, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 945, 951­
57 (1992). 
2. See Scott Shane, Obama Orders Secret Prisons and Detention Camps Closed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A1. 
3. See Anne E. Kornblut & Dafna Linzer, White House Regroups on Guanta­
namo, WASH. POST. Sept. 25, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/24/AR2009092404893.html. 
4. Id.  The attempted Christmas Day bombing has heightened concern about the 
accuracy of decisions to release detainees. See Charlie Savage, Nigerian Man Is In­
dicted in Attempted Plane Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at A14; David G. Savage, 
Yemenis Might Stall Closure of Guantanamo, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at A10. 
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preceding eight years.5  Equity speaks to burden-sharing.  Both do­
mestic political actors, such as legislators, and representatives of 
other sovereign nations wish to ensure that no one site ends up with 
a disproportionate number of detainees.  However, the domestic 
and international audiences clash in how they prioritize equity.  Do­
mestic audiences fear an overconcentration of detainees in any one 
state as well as the outright release of detainees into any commu­
nity.  Foreign governments wish to avoid a disproportionate share 
of detainees compared with other nations.  Accuracy requires relia­
ble determinations of a detainee’s past affiliations and future 
dangerousness. 
The challenge arises because these factors often conflict.  Un­
less policymakers are careful, efficiency will trump both accuracy 
and equity.  This result yields erroneous risk assessments and skews 
distribution of burdens.  The Bush administration used Guanta­
namo as a site for suspected terrorists precisely because it valued 
the site’s ease of use and discounted the two other factors.  The 
Supreme Court rebuked the Bush administration in a series of 
landmark cases.6  President Obama rightly sought to remedy the 
problem that the Bush administration had created.  Ironically, how­
ever, his initial efforts also failed to manage the conflict between 
efficiency, equity, and accuracy. 
Obama’s early announcement of a one-year deadline neglected 
the importance of signaling.  In dealing with external audiences, 
such as Congress, signaling is vital to assure trust.  Ambiguous sig­
nals generate mistrust, despite the sender’s good intentions.  Ironi­
5. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, § 2(b), 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009) 
[hereinafter Executive Order 13,492], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press 
_office/closureofguantanamodetentionfacilities/. 
6. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (striking down provi­
sions of Military Commissions Act enacted at President Bush’s prompting that pre­
cluded access to habeas corpus for Guantanamo detainees); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that Congress had not authorized President Bush’s unilateral 
establishment of military commissions to try suspected terrorists); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that Congress had authorized detention of individuals ap­
prehended on the battlefield, but that government must provide due process).  For com­
mentary on this line of cases, see David D. Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational 
Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay, 2007-08 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47 (2008) (prais­
ing Boumediene). Cf. Neal Kumar Katval, Hamdan v. Rumsfield: The Legal Academy 
Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 92-103 (2006) (describing President Bush’s 
order establishing military commissions as unprecedented assertion of presidential 
power that undermined settled norms); Eric A. Posner, International Law and the War 
on Terror: Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2007-08 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 39-46 (2008) (criticizing Boumediene as unduly extending pro­
tections of American law to noncitizens not on American soil). 
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cally, Congress took Obama’s early closure deadline as a signal that 
he shared Bush’s prioritizing of efficiency over accuracy.7  For Con­
gress, this meant that Obama cared more about closing Guanta­
namo on deadline and less about the probability of false 
negatives—the release of truly dangerous individuals.8  Congress 
also worried that Obama cared more about equity among nations 
asked to resettle detainees and less about equity among states 
where the administration would seek to transfer detainees who 
could not be resettled internationally. 
After several months of cross-talk with Congress, the adminis­
tration adjusted its signaling.9  Beginning with Obama’s May 2009 
speech at the National Archives,10 the administration indicated that 
its first priority was achieving the right balance between efficiency, 
accuracy, and equity.  In another irony, Obama achieved that bal­
ance by indicating that he was willing to accept, albeit with height­
ened procedural safeguards, a number of the measures initiated by 
the Bush administration, including military commissions and deten­
tion under the law of war.  Congress responded by signaling greater 
willingness to work with the President to fashion a comprehensive 
process for closing Guantanamo.11 
To analyze the prospects for closing Guantanamo, this Article 
includes five parts.  Part I sets out the values of efficiency, equity, 
and accuracy that should guide decisions about siting and disposi­
tion.  Part II discusses the importance of signaling and the problems 
caused by initial ambiguous signals in a path-dependent policy pro­
cess.  Part III describes how early inattention to signals sent to Con­
gress caused problems for the new administration’s Guantanamo 
closure policy.  Part IV discusses the recalibration in signaling rep­
resented by President Obama’s May 2009 speech and the adminis­
tration’s follow-up on the three values described in Part I.  It 
concludes that the administration has arrived at an approach in con­
sultation with Congress that largely vindicates these values.  How­
ever, many improvements are still needed, such as access to habeas 
corpus for detainees at non-Guantanamo sites like Bagram Air 
Base in Afghanistan, limits on material support charges triable 
7. See Kornblut & Linzer, supra note 3. R 
8. See id. 
9. See id. 
10. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security 
(May 21, 2009) [hereinafter Obama Remarks], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09. 
11. See Kornblut & Linzer, supra note 3. R 
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before military commissions, and the use of hearsay evidence.  Part 
V discusses logistical and policy options for overcoming political re­
sistance to the closure of Guantanamo and the transfer of detainees 
to custodial facilities in the United States. 
I. THREE CORE VALUES: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND ACCURACY 
The political and ideological debates surrounding Guantanamo 
can sometimes obscure the central values at stake.  These core val­
ues are efficiency, equity, and accuracy.  I discuss each in turn. 
A. Efficiency 
Efficiency entails the simplest way to achieve a given goal.  As 
a general matter, approaches that take more time or create more 
decision costs are not efficient.  However, efficiency offers less reli­
able guidance when goals conflict, or when one defines goals at dif­
ferent levels of generality or over different time horizons. 
As one neutral example, consider the question of transporta­
tion.  Given the question, “What is the most efficient way to get 
from an individual’s suburban home to her suburban office today?,” 
the answer might well be, “Drive my car.”  However, if the question 
were framed differently, as, “What is the most efficient way to re­
duce consumption of carbon-based fuels?,” then the respondent 
would consider whether it was practicable to bike to work or take a 
bus.  Reliance on notions of efficiency often privileges short-term 
inquiries.12  However, that results from humans’ distorted discount­
ing function,13 not any inherent attribute of efficiency. 
Some developing countries may also ask, “What is the most 
efficient way that we can grow our economies?”  This question 
might yield the answer, “Rely on currently cheap fossil fuels such as 
coal as much as possible.”  But, if one asked the question differ­
ently, as, “How do we most efficiently ensure that our economic 
growth is sustainable?,” then we might arrive at a different answer 
that emphasized renewable energy sources.14 
12. See Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 66, 69 (1972). 
13. See Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law After Katrina: Reforming Envi­
ronmental Law by Reforming Environmental Lawmaking, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1019, 1043 
(2007) (discussing the “tendency of human nature to discount disproportionately the 
consequences of human conduct that are distant rather than immediate”). 
14. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523-24 (2007) (rejecting the agency’s 
argument that greenhouse gas emissions from China and India will render moot any 
United States efforts to reduce emissions); cf. Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as 
343 
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As another example of the disposition of persons, consider the 
issue of community placements for people with mental disabilities. 
Decades ago, state governments faced with opposition from civil 
liberties advocates and budgetary concerns decided to move people 
out of huge institutions.15  The most efficient means for moving 
people out of psychiatric hospitals was placing former inpatients in 
large “adult homes.”  These facilities were technically located in 
communities.  As a practical matter, however, adult homes often 
replicated the worst aspects of institutional living.16  In contrast, 
policy makers who defined efficiency as the development of com­
munity placements that offer people with mental disabilities the 
chance to live independently would stress more human-scale resi­
dential alternatives. 
The operation of the Guantanamo detention facility under 
President Bush also revealed internal tensions within the concept of 
efficiency.  A narrow vision of efficiency drove the Bush adminis­
tration’s establishment of the facility.  Bush officials focused on 
Guantanamo’s appeal as a site outside the United States and be­
lieved that geography would defeat accountability.17  The govern­
ment would then be free to detain, interrogate, and punish 
suspected terrorists with minimal interference.  The Supreme Court 
ultimately rejected this vision.18  Moreover, the Bush administra-
Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary v. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 
681 (2008) (discussing the role of subnational actors). 
15. See Peter Margulies, The New Class Action Jurisprudence and Public Interest 
Law, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 487, 514-15 (1999). 
16. See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03-CV-3209(NGG), 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 80975, at *5, 50 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009) (holding that New York’s policy 
of referring former psychiatric inpatients to adult homes and reimbursing their care 
violated Americans with Disabilities Act). 
17. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to Wil­
liam J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel Dep’t of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://www. 
aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf.  For criticism of the legal advice 
supporting the selection of Guantanamo as a site for detention and interrogation of 
suspected terrorists, see Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture 
Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 455, 455 (2005); Stephen Gillers, Legal Eth­
ics: A Debate, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 236, 237-38 (Karen J. Greenberg 
ed., 2006); David Luban, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in LEGAL  ETHICS AND 
HUMAN  DIGNITY 162, 176-80, 200-02 (2007); Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law: 
National Security Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68 
MD. L. REV. 1, 35-40 (2008); Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency of 
Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579 
(2009); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 80-85 (2005). 
18. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534-36 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 
466, 485 (2004). 
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tion also pursued a competing vision of efficiency that focused on 
ad hoc deals to placate allies.19  In one such case, the Bush adminis­
tration agreed to the release of a Kuwaiti detainee named Abdallah 
Salih al-Ajmi who had earlier fought with the Taliban.  Al-Ajmi 
subsequently blew himself up in northern Iraq in a suicide bombing 
that killed members of Iraq’s security forces.20  For a global power 
like the United States, siting a detention facility for suspected ter­
rorists inevitably exhibits efficiency’s disparate meanings. 
B. Equity and Facility Siting 
Efficiency also clashes with another fundamental value: equity. 
Equity refers to communities, states, and countries receiving an 
equal or equivalent share of both benefits and burdens.21  Allocat­
ing burdens disproportionately to one entity is inequitable. 
Equity issues often arise because the promotion of public 
goods that aid all of society may also engender more localized 
harm.  If every community stresses localized harm over public 
goods, the result is the familiar “Not in My Backyard” syndrome.22 
However, the government’s failure to equitably allocate localized 
harms raises concerns about equity.  Land use and refugee resettle­
ment policy constitute two examples. 
In land use, siting certain kinds of facilities can promote impor­
tant public policies but also impose disproportionate impacts on 
particular communities.  For example, suppose one believes that 
wind farms can supply an efficient solution to the problem of sus­
taining an economy in an era of increasingly scarce resources while 
managing climate change.  To achieve this public good, policymak­
ers would consider efficiency issues at a more concrete level, asking 
where government should site wind farms to maximize the benefit 
from this sustainable technology.  Here is where equity enters the 
19. See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., SETON HALL LAW CENTER FOR POLICY & RE­
SEARCH, PROFILE OF  RELEASED  GUANTANAMO  DETAINEES: THE  GOVERNMENT’S 
STORY  THEN AND  NOW 19-25 (2008), available at http://law.shu.edu/center_policy 
research/reports/detainees_then_and_now_final.pdf; cf. Peter Margulies, The Detainees’ 
Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of Advocacy Strategies in the War on Terror, 57 BUFF. 
L. REV. 347, 407 n.220 (2009) (arguing that the Bush administration’s reasons for de­
clining to release detainees also included concerns about security situation in Yemen 
and compliance with Convention Against Torture). 
20. See Josh White, Ex-Guantanamo Detainee Joined Iraq Suicide Attack, WASH. 
POST, May 8, 2008, at A18. 
21. Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do with It?  Environmental Justice and the 
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1028-30 (1993). 
22. Id. at 1001. 
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equation.  Efficiency, in this narrow sense, may be served by siting 
as many wind farms as possible in communities that lack the politi­
cal or economic clout to resist siting.  However, while wind farms 
are presumably a relatively benign technology—indeed, that is part 
and parcel of their appeal—they do have localized impacts in terms 
of noise and appearance.  Considerations of equity would demand 
sharing these burdens across communities, although this approach 
would be less efficient if policymakers wished to build the maxi­
mum number of turbines in the shortest possible time. 
Allowing space for airing concerns about equity has become 
important in addressing community opposition to siting decisions. 
Consider, for example, the environmental-justice movement.  Low-
income communities of color have rightly complained that certain 
undesirable uses, including waste plants, have been disproportion­
ately located near them.23  These communities receive the brunt of 
harms associated with such projects, including pollution, noise, and 
noxious aromas.  Accommodating these legitimate concerns clashes 
with the “efficient” construction of facilities. 
Facilities serving people also promote public goods but often 
impose localized harms.  For example, residential treatment facili­
ties for people with substance abuse problems clearly serve the pub­
lic interest by enhancing alternatives to drug addiction and 
incarceration.  However, situating such facilities disproportionately 
in low-income communities imposes risks on these communities, in­
cluding the risks from facility residents who relapse in their rehabil­
itation and break the law.24 
In the human services context, such fears may often be exag­
gerated.  Many facilities are well run, minimizing adverse impacts 
on their communities.  Often attitudes hostile to such facilities stem 
from animus, not from attention to the facts.25  Indeed, in address­
23. See Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grass-
roots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Move­
ment, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 775 (1998); cf. Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative 
Lawyering: Navigating the Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REV. 
1999, 2001-02 (2007) (discussing equity in siting of redevelopment projects that displace 
low-income community residents). 
24. Cf. Ellen M. Weber, Bridging the Barriers: Public Health Strategies for Ex­
panding Drug Treatment in Communities, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 631, 677-78 (2005) (dis­
cussing case law). But see id. at 726 (discussing sincere community concerns, 
particularly concerns about facilities that fail to provide adequate services or permit 
drug use by facility residents). 
25. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) 
(holding that enacting restrictive zoning regulations for a group home for people with 
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ing complaints of discrimination from long-time providers of drug 
addiction rehabilitation or similar services, courts have found that 
localities raising concerns about overconcentration have violated 
federal fair housing legislation.26 
However, even in such cases, equity is important.  First, gov­
ernment’s commitment to equity sends the message that such facili­
ties in fact serve the public good.  When government endures the 
tougher contest of siting facilities in communities better able to mo­
bilize opposition, it demonstrates its sincere view that such facilities 
serve pressing social needs.27  Second, equity helps defuse opposi­
tion.  As democracy shows again and again, when communities 
have a voice, they are more likely to accept results as fair.28  When 
states have used equitable formulas to allocate uses such as group 
homes, they have often built a consensus that would be lacking in 
the absence of such procedures.  Having a voice also provides com­
munities with a sense of control and counters fears that the govern­
ment will act out of expedience, not principle. 
Equity also emerges on the question of refugee resettlement.29 
Scholars advocating for regional refugee resettlement have empha­
sized that regional solutions share the burden of resettlement.30 
They allocate refugee flow to a range of countries instead of con-
mental retardation based on unsubstantiated fears while allowing uses such as dormito­
ries was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
26. See Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 
50-51 (2d Cir. 2002). 
27. See generally Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitu­
tional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE 
L.J. 2, 32 (2008) (arguing that requiring more extensive procedures from legislatures as 
a “price” for enacting law assures courts that a legislature is committed to policy and 
understands consequences). 
28. See generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 27-30 (1990) (assert­
ing that belief in procedural fairness, including decision makers’ rejection of self-deal­
ing, inspires compliance with legal norms); cf. Bernard P. Perlmutter, “Unchain the 
Children”: Gault, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Shackling, 9 BARRY L. REV. 1, 54-59 
(2007) (discussing how giving children more control in juvenile justice cases by rejecting 
practice of shackling children in the courtroom promotes rehabilitation). 
29. Questions of equity in refugee resettlement are not new.  President Franklin 
Roosevelt considered the issue in attempting to formulate a plan for the resettlement of 
Jewish refugees from Germany. See Patricia Cohen, Roosevelt and the Jews: A Debate 
Rekindled, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at C25 (discussing new book that outlines 
Roosevelt’s consideration of a plan that would have resettled refugees in a number of 
countries). 
30. Susan M. Akram & Terry Rempel, Temporary Protection as an Instrument for 
Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 12-13 
(2004); see Tally Kritzman-Amir, Not in My Backyard: On the Morality of Responsibility 
Sharing in Refugee Law, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 355 (2009) (discussing numerous reset­
tlement mechanisms and the benefits that each provide). 
347 
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centrating refugees in one country where burdens become unman­
ageable.  Within host countries, equity is also important.  In the 
United States, for example, some efforts were made to resettle refu­
gees in different states, to avoid undue concentrations of refugees.31 
Where concentrations developed, the federal government offered 
aid to defray state costs entailed in providing education and other 
services.32  Federal outreach was not always as effective as it should 
have been.  Moreover, a few “gateway” states generally absorb 
most of the immigrant population along with resulting costs.33 
These states pay in more to the federal government than they re­
ceive back in immigrant-related aid.34  However, this issue points to 
a problem with ensuring equity, not a flaw in looking to equity as a 
guiding principle. 
C. Accuracy 
In any question regarding siting facilities or the placement of 
people, accuracy is a fundamental value.  Policies carried out with 
breathtaking efficiency amount to very little if they are based on 
inaccurate information.  Accuracy in any decision must minimize 
two kinds of errors: false positives and false negatives. 
False positives are errors where we think a person, practice, or 
condition is harmful, but it actually is not.35  False negatives are er­
rors that occur when we believe a person, practice, or condition is 
harmless, but it actually poses dangers.36  As an example, consider 
whether proximity to power lines causes a heightened risk of can­
cer.  If we believed power lines had this consequence, but they do 
not, we would be committing a “Type I” error, which results in a 
false positive.  However, if we believed that proximity to power 
lines had no ill effects, but it actually correlates with a heightened 
31. See 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
32. Id. § 1522(b)(2). 
33. See generally Shirley Tang, Challenges of Policy and Practice in Under-
Resourced Asian American Communities: Analyzing Public Education, Health, and De­
velopment Issues with Cambodian American Women, 15 ASIAN  AM. L.J. 153 (2008) 
(discussing the dispersion of varying Asian ethnic groups within Massachusetts). 
34. Cf. Phuong Ly, State Urged to Invest More in English Classes, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 27, 2005, at T16 (discussing federal spending cuts hindering Maryland’s effort to 
provide adult education to burgeoning immigrant population). 
35. See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 578 (2000). 
36. See id. (arguing that in the context of international trade law that a false posi­
tive is a measure invalidated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) even though the 
measure is actually not protectionist, while a false negative is a measure that the WTO 
upholds, even though the measure unfairly favors economic interests in one nation). 
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health risk, we would be committing a “Type II” error, resulting in a 
false negative.  Guarding against each error is important, since each 
has opportunity costs.  If we restrict the erection of power lines be­
cause of erroneous health concerns, we forego the savings gener­
ated by ready distribution of electricity.  By the same token, if we 
unduly discounted health risks linked with power lines, we would 
be neglecting an opportunity to enhance the health and well-being 
of persons subject to these risks and would end up paying more in 
medical costs. 
The law often imposes procedural safeguards to promote accu­
racy.  In the environmental setting, for example, the National Envi­
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires an environmental impact 
statement (EIS) prior to the start of a project.37  This requirement 
gives a developer of a site an opportunity to consider whether a 
project may harm the environment, and it gives community groups, 
elected officials, and the media an opportunity to conduct a dia­
logue regarding possible harms.38  The changes to a project accom­
plished through the EIS process establish the virtues of such 
procedures. 
The criminal justice system historically cares more about false 
positives than about false negatives.39  No justice system that is wor­
thy of the name can discount the concern about false positives, 
whether the adjudication concerned is criminal or civil, judicial or 
administrative.40  Procedures that avoid false positives are also ar­
guably central to international-law guarantees of due process.41 
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
38. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 389 (2008) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (citing Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989)); cf. 
Jared Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. (forthcom­
ing 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460924 (arguing that the majority in 
Winter undermined NEPA by allowing the Navy to continue training exercises that al­
legedly harmed marine mammals while it completed an EIS). 
39. Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-63 (1970) (stating that the rules of evi­
dence are “historically grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard men from 
dubious and unjust convictions” (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 
(1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, 
Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009) 
(discussing wrongful convictions produced by poor application of forensic science). 
40. Cf. Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying 
the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing that President Bush’s order 
establishing military commissions failed to provide for rudimentary procedural 
safeguards). 
41. See David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military 
Commission, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 5, 79-80 (2005) (discussing international procedural 
norms in military commission context). 
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Some argue that terrorism presents a different calculus.  For 
example, in the early response to September 11, constitutional 
scholar Laurence Tribe argued that we needed to pay more atten­
tion to the problem of false negatives.42  When wrongdoing involves 
the risk of thousands of lives, as a terrorist attack can, applying 
Winship’s approach to all detention cases gives the public interest 
short shrift.  In other contexts involving detention, we insist on far 
less evidence.  For example, the detention of prisoners of war re­
quires no evidence of concrete conduct;43 it is sufficient to just wear 
an enemy uniform. 
The Bush administration took this approach to an extreme.  It 
cared very little about the problem of false positives.  To determine 
the status and dangerousness of Guantanamo detainees, the gov­
ernment relied principally on Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
(CSRTs).44  The CSRTs do not allow legal representation.45  They 
frequently failed to provide a detainee with the evidence against 
him, notice of the most serious charges, or an opportunity to chal­
lenge that evidence.46  They also typically do not allow a detainee to 
present evidence beyond the detainee’s own testimony.  In addi­
tion, the government can convene more than one CSRT per de­
tainee, to shop for the result it desires.47 
The Bush administration never acknowledged that combat 
against terrorist groups also makes avoidance of false positives 
more urgent.  Terrorists generally do not wear uniforms.  This raises 
the risk that we will mistakenly detain those who are in the wrong 
place at the wrong time.48  While independent reports suggest that a 
significant cohort of detainees remaining at Guantanamo are dan­
gerous, these reports also acknowledge that the procedures estab­
42. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Fury: Why Congress Must Curb Bush’s Mili­
tary Courts, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 10, 2001, at 18, 20. 
43. See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74-76 (D.D.C. 2009). 
44. See MARK  DENBEAUX & JOSHUA  DENBEAUX, NO-HEARING  HEARINGS— 
CSRT: THE  MODERN  HABEAS  CORPUS? 7 (2006), available at http://law.shu.edu/ 
publications/guantanamoReports/final_no_hearing_hearings_report.pdf.  The govern­
ment has used military commissions in only a handful of cases. 
45. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008). 
46. Id.  The CSRTs also had no limits on the introduction of hearsay evidence, 
making the ability to challenge adverse evidence “more theoretical than real.” Id. 
47. See DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, supra note 44, at 37.  Despite stacking the R 
deck, the Bush administration sometimes generated false negatives when it released 
detainees to please American allies. See White, supra note 20. R 
48. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (discussing the risk of 
sweeping up “errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid worker”). 
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lished by the Bush administration led to an unacceptably high rate 
of false positives.49 
D. Summary 
The Bush administration’s experience illustrates the inter­
dependence of the values identified in this section.  The Bush ad­
ministration assembled Guantanamo in a search for the most 
efficient way to eliminate false negatives.  Ultimately, however, the 
Bush system’s indifference to false positives undermined the legiti­
macy of its counterterrorism program.  The damage done to 
America’s reputation made counterterrorism policy less efficient in 
the long term than a policy that matched toughness with concern 
for traditional safeguards.  Moreover, the unilateralist temperament 
that guided Guantanamo’s emergence as a site for suspected ter­
rorists also alienated the courts, which proceeded to modify the sys­
tem that Bush officials had created.50 
II. SIGNALING AND NORMS 
As the Bush administration’s experience demonstrates, norms 
like efficiency, equity, and accuracy do not play out in a vacuum. 
Political and legal disputes inevitably introduce various audiences 
and constituencies.  The tensions between norms become even 
more acute when one considers that different audiences prioritize 
different norms.  For example, the audience for United States for­
eign policy includes domestic audiences like the Congress, the 
courts, the press, and the public, along with advocacy groups on one 
side of an issue or another.  International audiences also figure in 
the equation, including foreign governments, transnational tribu­
nals, and electorates.  Before indicating approval of an executive 
policy, each audience looks for a signal that the President shares its 
norms. 
A. Signaling, Values, and Trust 
Signaling is crucial because a central problem with public and 
private life is a paucity of trust.51  People in public life encounter 
suspicion from audiences who believe that the leader cannot be 
49. See BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE 
IN THE AGE OF TERROR 74-79 (2008). 
50. See JACK  GOLDSMITH, THE  TERROR  PRESIDENCY: LAW AND  JUDGMENT  IN­
SIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 205-08 (2007). 
51. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-20 (2000). 
351 
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trusted to observe a norm valued by that audience.  The audience 
will then be unwilling to cooperate with the leader.  Individuals and 
entities send signals to indicate that they are worthy of trust.  For 
example, a bank-seeking depositor will invest in a building to indi­
cate to potential customers that it intends to be around for a long 
time and thus will not sell out the customer for a quick pay-off.52 
However, people run into difficulties when perceptual asymmetries 
lead different audiences to interpret signals in different ways.  As a 
quick example, suppose that a young male professional decides that 
a modest ear piercing will signal fashion sense.53  This signal works 
well with other moderately fashion-conscious young professionals. 
However, it may send the “wrong” signal to other groups.  For ex­
ample, older individuals may believe that even a modest piercing 
signals a fundamental rejection of norms associated with civilized 
society.  Some older individuals clearly took this view of long hair 
in the 1960s.  On the other hand, it is possible that some groups that 
do sincerely reject mainstream norms, such as gangs, may also view 
our earnest but fashionable professional as an aspirant to member­
ship in their group.  They may seek to enlist the professional in ini­
tiation rituals that conflict with mainstream values.  The result may 
be a threat to the professional standing of the actor (with older peo­
ple) or a threat to his health (with gangs). 
Politicians must be aware of the possibility of such perceptual 
asymmetry, or “mixed or crossed signals” in the vernacular.  When 
such asymmetries occur, one audience will view the leader as un­
trustworthy and will retaliate or hedge its bets.  Leaders need to 
understand the interpretations that different audiences will attri­
bute to particular signals in addition to understanding their subjec­
tive intent.  Saying “I meant well” is an indication that such 
perceptual asymmetry has muddied the leader’s message. 
B. Flawed Signaling and Path Dependence 
Faulty signaling has costs that are sometimes irreversible. 
Some might argue that issues with initial signals matter little be­
cause a President has the resources to recoup later, by righting her 
message.  Unfortunately, one cannot guarantee that garbled signals 
will be costless in this way.  This is true because of the phenomenon 
of path dependence. 
52. Id. at 20-21. 
53. Id. at 29. 
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Path dependence suggests that where we have been influences 
where we are going.  Taking a different path to a goal makes certain 
options more or less palatable to different groups.  Measures that 
may be acceptable in one signaling environment become unaccept­
able when the environment changes.  If the President loses credibil­
ity on an issue, he will have to spend valuable capital in returning to 
the status quo ante.  For example, if a crucial audience interprets a 
presidential signal as a preference for efficiency over accuracy, it 
will demand a more rigorous bonding mechanism to ensure that the 
President values accuracy appropriately.  For example, the courts 
responded to the Bush administration’s overreaching on detention 
by requiring procedural safeguards.54  Moreover, losing credibility 
with a crucial audience gives adversaries an opening.  Credibility 
can be difficult to recoup.  While a President consumes time and 
effort in this task, the other side has the opportunity to promote its 
own agenda.55  These consequences need not be fatal to the Presi­
dent’s policy preferences.  However, they do introduce complica­
tions that more judicious signaling could have finessed. 
With this framework in mind, we can consider the impact of 
President Obama’s January 2009 announcement of a one-year 
deadline for closing Guantanamo. 
III.	 THE GUANTANAMO CLOSURE DEADLINE: CONSEQUENCES, 
INTENDED AND UNINTENDED 
The Obama administration has done many things right in its 
efforts to close Guantanamo and paved the way for a process that 
vindicates United States security needs and the demands of justice. 
It has made a concerted effort to reverse the unilateralism and 
high-handed policies of the Bush administration.  However, it did a 
number of those things in the wrong order, which needlessly com­
plicated its task and spawned opportunity costs. 
54. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (holding that detainees 
had access to habeas corpus). 
55. For more on path dependence, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS 
OF  REASON 108-110 (2009); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The 
Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 
606-22 (2001). 
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A.	 The Obama Closure Announcement and the Reframing of 
Efficiency 
President Obama’s announcement that he would close Guanta­
namo within a year redefined efficiency in counterterrorism.  Bush 
and Cheney viewed efficiency narrowly, as the speed entailed in 
taking concrete steps to kill or incapacitate terrorists.56  President 
Obama has a broader vision.  While the President does not slight 
the importance of killing or detaining those who would do violence 
against the United States, he also views efficiency as entailing the 
accumulation of good will throughout the world.57  The President 
understands the importance of American soft power to our ability 
to achieve policy goals.58  When America has credibility on the 
world stage, it can count on cooperation from other governments 
and populations.  Moreover, American credibility blunts charges of 
excess or hypocrisy that furnish recruiting tools for terrorists. 
President Obama noted in his closure order that Guantanamo 
had become a symbol of overreaching that undermined the United 
States’s global reputation.59  Closing Guantanamo was one element 
in a program to efficiently restore American credibility.  Armed 
with that credibility, America could win the battle for hearts and 
minds.  President Obama’s view of the strategic value of closing 
Guantanamo was correct.  However, his sequencing of events cre­
ated doubts about both the accuracy and equity that impeded this 
larger project. 
B.	 The Costs of Faulty Sequencing 
The Obama administration’s setting of a one-year deadline for 
closing Guantanamo created a backlash on Capitol Hill that 
56. As President Bush’s second term progressed, key figures like Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates (held over by incoming President Obama) and Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice came to believe that the closure of Guantanamo would promote 
America’s foreign policy goals.  While Secretary Gates drew down the Guantanamo 
detainee census, the Bush administration could not mount a sustained effort to close the 
facility. See Helen Cooper and William Glaberson, At White House, Renewed Debate 
on Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2007, at A1. 
57. See Executive Order 13,492, supra note 5, § 2(b), at 4897.	 R 
58. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE  PARADOX OF  AMERICAN  POWER: WHY THE 
WORLD’S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE 35 (2002) (warning that global re­
action to American tactics viewed as excessive will undermine cooperation); Christo­
pher J. Borgen, Hearts and Minds and Laws: Legal Compliance and Diplomatic 
Persuasion, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 774-78 (2009) (discussing the importance of global 
credibility); cf. Harold Honju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1479, 1499-1501 (2003) (arguing against unilateral policies). 
59. See Executive Order 13,492, supra note 5, § 2(b), (d), at 4897, 4898.	 R 
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stretched across party and ideology.  Some dismissed this backlash 
as a crude expression of the “Not-In-My-Backyard” (NIMBY) syn­
drome.60  NIMBY surely played a role.  However, legitimate con­
cerns with accuracy and equity also drove opposition. 
1. Signaling on Accuracy 
First consider the issue of accuracy.  The Obama administra­
tion understood the problem of false positives that it had inherited 
from the Bush administration.61  However, it did not initially take 
adequate stock of the problem of false negatives.  Officials who 
pushed for the one-year deadline had not yet inspected the files of 
Guantanamo detainees.62  These officials therefore lacked adequate 
information on the dangerousness of individual detainees, or on dif­
ficulties the administration would encounter in resettlement 
efforts.63 
An approach that reconciled the problems of false positives 
and negatives would have started instead with a comprehensive re­
view of detainee law and policy as well as an examination of indi­
vidual detainee files.  This review and analysis could have paved the 
way for setting a realistic deadline for closing the facility.  The ad­
ministration instead first announced that it intended to close Guan­
tanamo within a year, and only then began its review of the files. 
60. See Sarah Mendelson, The Guantanamo Countdown, FOREIGN POL’Y, Oct. 1, 
2009, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/01/the_guantanamo_ 
countdown?page=0,1&%24Version=0&%24Path=/&%24Domain=.Foreignpolicy.com, 
%20%24Version%3D0 (asserting that “members of Congress were running for cover 
like children in a rain storm”); Editorial, Hypocrisy on the Hill, WASH. POST, July 5, 
2009, at A18. 
61. See Executive Order 13,492, supra note 5, § 2(b), at 4897. R 
62. See Kornblut & Linzer, supra note 3; cf. KEN  GUDE, CTR. FOR  AM. PRO- R 
GRESS, GETTING BACK ON TRACK TO CLOSE GUANTANAMO 3 (2009), available at http: 
//www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/11/pdf/closing_guantanamo.pdf (noting that 
Obama officials found that detainee files were in disarray, which further slowed the 
review process). 
63. Resettlement difficulties flow from two sources.  First, the Bush and Obama 
administrations both agreed not to transfer detainees to countries where the detainees 
would face a risk of torture. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu­
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, arts. 1-2, U.N. GAOR, 
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984); cf. Belbacha v. Bush, 520 F.3d 452, 454 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (noting Algerian detainee’s fear of torture); Del Quentin Wilber, Chinese Detain­
ees’ Release Is Blocked, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2008, at A3 (noting Chinese detainees’ 
fear of torture).  Second, both administrations worried about security arrangements for 
released detainees in Yemen, the country of origin for approximately forty percent of 
the detainees remaining as of October 2009. See Robert F. Worth, Wanted by F.B.I., 
but Walking out of a Yemen Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2008, at A3 (noting convicted 
terrorist’s exit from court hearing in Yemen). 
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This sequencing made the one-year deadline seem arbitrary.  An­
nouncing the deadline also allowed opponents to argue that the ad­
ministration had discounted the need for accuracy in release 
decisions.64 
Congress responded quickly.  In resolutions and appropriations 
measures, it sought to bar the expenditure of federal funds on clos­
ing Guantanamo and resettling detainees within the United 
States.65  It also required the executive to notify Congress when re­
lease of a detainee was imminent.66 
Congress’s restrictions on closing Guantanamo were a proxy 
for concerns about accuracy.  Substantial uncertainty surrounded 
decisions about the dangerousness of remaining detainees.  Con­
gress understood that uncertainty includes both the probability and 
gravity of harm.  Any release process carries with it the prospect of 
some false negatives.  Moreover, a terrorist attack on the site used 
for the trial or detention of a terrorist would have catastrophic con­
sequences, as New York discovered during the first attack on the 
World Trade Center in 1993 and the September 11 attacks.  Since 
the government could not guarantee determinations of dangerous­
ness that are completely accurate, Congress sought to compensate 
for that accuracy deficit by prohibiting the transfer of detainees to 
the United States.67 
This was not the first time that Congress has acted out of un­
certainty about both the probability and gravity of false negatives.68 
64. Both the President and Secretary of Defense Gates have argued that setting a 
deadline signals to the bureaucracy that statements about change are not mere “cheap 
talk.”  That position makes intuitive sense.  However, it is unclear that President 
Obama’s closure deadline had such salutary consequences.  Experts have noted that 
bureaucrats lost interest in the difficult, tedious task of sorting through detainee files 
because no one person in the White House mounted a sustained effort to complete the 
task. See Mendelson, supra note 60.  Moreover, the administration also failed to R 
promptly follow up on the Inauguration Day announcement’s potential for generating 
cooperation in other countries.  A special diplomatic envoy to promote detainee reset­
tlement was not in place until months after the President’s announcement. Id. 
65. See Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2346, Operation and Mainte­
nance, Defense-Wide § 3, 111th Cong. (2009) (engrossed amendment as agreed to by 
Senate, May 21, 2009) (making funds available only to relocate detainees outside the 
United States), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 
111_cong_bills&docid=f:h2346eas.txt.pdf. 
66. See Editorial, supra note 60. R 
67. Id. 
68. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, 
and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 694 (2009). 
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Some measures have been struck down by courts69 or have survived 
largely as negative examples.70  Others have met with somewhat 
greater acceptance.  For example, in Demore v. Kim, the Supreme 
Court upheld Congress’s decision to require prehearing detention 
of persons deportable because they have engaged in terrorism or 
committed a criminal offense.71  The Court noted that many people 
show up at hearings when individualized determinations including 
bond are required.72  However, there are invariably some false 
negatives—people who turn out to be flight risks despite the indi­
vidualized assessments.  The Court found that Congress could have 
reasonably decided that it wanted to cut false negatives to zero.73 
The Guantanamo restrictions have a similar underlying rationale. 
This rationale echoes traditional approaches to tort law and 
other areas.  Courts have long balanced the probability and gravity 
of harm.74  When a particular harm is sufficiently grave, precautions 
increase even if probabilities are low.  To consider a good analogy, 
take the case of peanut allergies.  A prudent individual with such an 
allergy will avoid even a low probability of exposure because he 
knows the stakes.  Some public policy decisions embody a similar 
logic.75 
Congress’s efforts also signaled that it wanted greater consulta­
tion with the President on decisions regarding detention of sus­
pected terrorists.76  Some of that further input might take the form 
of additional legislation, while in other cases informal consultation 
might be sufficient.  In any case, Congress indicated that it wished 
to be kept apprised. 
69. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2242 (2008) (striking down provi­
sions of Military Commissions Act limiting habeas corpus). 
70. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding statute 
criminalizing failure to comply with executive order that Japanese-Americans evacuate 
their homes on the West Coast). 
71. 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). 
72. Id. at 520. 
73. Id. at 528. 
74. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
75. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 494, 511-13 (2008) (noting flexibility in standing doctrine regarding 
challenges to long-term environmental harms). 
76. For an important discussion of the role of resolutions and other nonstatutory 
measures in congressional signaling, see Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: 
Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 588-89 (2008). 
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2. Signaling and Equity 
In addition, congressional action stemmed from concerns 
about the new administration’s perceived approach to equity.  Con­
gress believed that the administration’s Guantanamo policy re­
flected more concern about international aspects of equity in 
detainee transfers than about domestic ramifications.  Viewed from 
an international perspective, equity would counsel that the United 
States agree to accept some detainees if it expects other countries 
to volunteer to do the same.  A domestic perspective on equity, in 
contrast, focuses on burden-sharing among the several states.  By 
not responding to commentators who pushed the international-
equity point,77 the new administration stoked congressional appre­
hension that it would disregard domestic-equity concerns.78  The 
blizzard of bills and resolutions to limit Guantanamo closure re­
flected this anxiety.79 
The administration’s lack of response on this point also sig­
naled an initial inattention to trade-offs between international eq­
uity and the broader conception of efficiency that the 
administration had hoped to promote.  The international goodwill 
the administration sought involved cooperation from other global 
powers, including China.80  However, the Chinese opposed the ma­
jor international-equity step championed by advocates.81  Advo­
cates urged that the government permit the resettlement within the 
United States of the Uighur detainees—ethnic Turks and Chinese 
nationals who had been training to fight the Chinese government.82 
This step would have also raised accuracy concerns: federal law and 
policy has long sought to deter those planning violence against an­
77. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 60 (arguing for international perspective on R 
equity and detainee transfers). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Chinese cooperation would be necessary, for example, for efforts to contain 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
81. See Erik Eckholm, Freed from Guantanamo, Uighur Muslims Bask in Ber­
muda, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2009, at A4. 
82. For a cogent argument in favor of this position, see Barbara Olshansky, Why 
Are We Trying to Solve the “Problem of Guantanamo?,” A.B.A. NAT’L  SECURITY L. 
REP., Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 5, available at http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/nslr/2008/nov 
_dec_nslr_final.pdf. See also Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 555 F.3d 1022, 1024 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding evidence that “indicated that at least some petitioners in­
tended to fight the Chinese government, and that they had received firearms training 
. . . for this purpose” (citing Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 838, 843 (D.C. Cir. 2008))). 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-2\WNE203.txt unknown Seq: 20 24-MAY-10 13:38 
358 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:339 
other regime from using the United States as a hub.83  Admission of 
the Uighurs into the United States would have given them access to 
United States’s wealth and communications networks to continue 
their fight against the Chinese regime.  In contrast, settling the 
Uighurs elsewhere would limit the detainees’ influence and ac­
cess.84  The Chinese government was legitimately concerned about 
this issue.  However, the administration initially equivocated about 
the Uighurs, which China could have viewed as a signal that the 
administration had discounted Chinese concerns.85 
IV. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION FINDS ITS BEARINGS 
After a start hindered by faulty sequencing, the new adminis­
tration has made substantial progress in righting the course.  Presi­
dent Obama outlined the framework in his speech at the National 
Archives in May 2009.86  The President’s approach placed accuracy 
front and center and offered an approach that would minimize false 
positives and negatives.  Promoting accuracy will also serve the 
broader definition of efficiency advanced by the new administration 
by building international goodwill and leveraging America’s still-
substantial reserves of “soft power.” 
Broadly speaking, the President’s May address outlined a 
three-part approach to the detention of suspected terrorists.  First, 
the President noted, criminal prosecution in civilian courts will be 
83. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1029 n.14 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I)) (pro­
viding for the exclusion from the United States of aliens who engage in terrorist activ­
ity, including preparations for violence against another government).  Those accuracy 
concerns were present even though the Uighur detainees posed no direct threat to the 
United States. Id.; cf. Parhat, 532 F.3d at 854 (finding that the government had failed to 
prove that Parhat, an ethnic Uighur, was an “enemy combatant”).  Declining to provide 
safe harbor to those plotting violence against another regime promotes reciprocity in 
counterterrorism policy by encouraging other countries to deny safe harbor to those 
plotting violence against the United States. See also United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 
59, 74 (2d Cir. 1984) (analyzing provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
that authorize surveillance upon finding by court that target of surveillance is an agent 
for a foreign group seeking to “carry out raids against other nations”). 
84. The government has agreed that the Uighurs cannot be sent back to China 
because of the risk that they would be tortured. See Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 
561 F.3d 509, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (discussing government policy, while declining to 
order that the government provide advance notice to detainees of resettlement plans). 
The United States should provide other Uighurs who are already in the United States 
or duly apply for admission with an opportunity to demonstrate that they fall outside 
the exclusion provision cited above and qualify for refugee status. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(a) (2006) (defining refugee status). 
85. By June, the administration had righted the ship on this score, resettling a 
number of Uighur detainees in Bermuda. See Eckholm, supra note 81. R 
86. See Obama Remarks, supra note 10. R 
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the preferred route where “feasible.”87  Second, the President 
noted, military commissions are also an appropriate forum where 
detainees are charged with violations of the law of war.88  Third, the 
President asserted, in a small number of cases, trial in any venue 
will not be an option, and the government will then detain individu­
als under the laws of war while providing procedural safeguards and 
periodic review.89 
This framework is sound.  However, a couple of caveats are 
worth noting for further analysis.  First, President Obama’s May 
2009 framework balanced liberty and security precisely because it 
focused on overall values, instead of tailoring values to closure of 
Guantanamo by a date certain.90  Second, in some particulars the 
President’s approach did not adequately deal with the problem of 
false positives, both on questions of the reliability of evidence that 
courts have addressed since and on the question of extending ac­
countability to other detention sites, including the United States air 
base at Bagram in Afghanistan.  This part explores the President’s 
framework and pays particular attention to lingering accuracy 
issues.91 
A. Balancing Error Rates in Criminal Prosecutions 
The Obama administration’s decision to try both alleged 9/11 
mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and alleged Christmas Day 
87. Id. at 252; see also Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of 
Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts (2008), available at http:// 
www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf (arguing that federal 
courts can successfully conduct terrorism trials); Prosecuting Terrorists: Civilian and 
Military Trials for Guantanamo and Beyond, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terror­
ism and Homeland Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (Lex­
isNexis Congressional)  [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearing] (remarks of Sen. Sheldon 
Whitehouse, D-R.I.) (same). 
88. See Obama Remarks, supra note 10.  The Obama administration also worked R 
with Congress after the May address to refine rules on military commissions. See, e.g., 
Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 87 (testimony of Jeh Johnson, General Counsel for R 
the Defense Department, and David Kris, Assistant Att’y Gen. for National Security). 
In addition, the administration set up task forces on detention and other matters to 
clarify its legal approach. 
89. Obama Remarks, supra note 10. R 
90. Id.  The President did not disavow that date, although the conventional wis­
dom shifted toward the view that meeting the one-year deadline would be difficult, if 
not impossible. 
91. The next Part analyzes options under this framework for closing 
Guantanamo. 
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bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in federal court92 suggests 
that the President views the criminal justice system as the first re­
sort for the trial of suspected terrorists.  The federal courts have a 
reputation for independence that stems from the Constitution, the 
Framers, and the early precedents of the Supreme Court.93  Moreo­
ver, judges will best be able to balance the accountability supplied 
by open proceedings and the need for security required in exigent 
circumstances. 
To avoid false positives, federal judges presiding over trials of 
alleged terrorists must carefully analyze evidentiary issues.  They 
should exclude statements obtained through the use of coercive 
techniques.  Judges should also exclude evidence of marginal rele­
vance that will tend to inflame the jury, such as the video of Osama 
bin Laden offered by the government in a case against a Hamas 
fundraiser.94 
However, judges will also need to calibrate the rules of crimi­
nal procedure to give the government the flexibility that transna­
tional terrorism cases require.  For example, the exigencies of 
apprehending suspects abroad often preclude the immediate provi­
sion of a lawyer.  Government agents should be able to tailor Mi­
randa warnings to the resources available in a foreign country with 
a different legal system.95  Similarly, the warrant clause of the 
Fourth Amendment should not apply to searches abroad.96  In­
stead, courts should evaluate such searches under standards of rea­
sonableness that consider the prevailing environment in the nation 
92. See Eric Lichtblau & Benjamin Weiser, For Both Sides, Unparalleled Legal 
Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A13 (discussing decision regarding Khalid 
Shaikh Mohammed); Savage, Nigerian Indicted in Terrorist Plot, supra note 4 (discuss- R 
ing charges filed against Abdulmutallab). 
93. See Gerald E. Rosen & Kyle W. Harding, Reflections upon Judicial Indepen­
dence as We Approach the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison: Safeguarding the Con­
stitution’s “Crown Jewel,” 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 791-92 (discussing the role of the 
Framers in drafting the Constitution to provide for an independent judiciary and the 
role of the Supreme Court in defining its role as an independent coequal branch of the 
government). 
94. See United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 161-63 (2d Cir. 2008). 
95. See United States v. Odeh (In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. 
Afr. (Fifth Amendment Challenges)), 552 F.3d 177, 206-09 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding 
modified Miranda warning in case of defendant convicted of role in 1998 bombings of 
United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania). 
96. See United States v. Odeh (In re Terrorist Bombings of the U.S. Embassies in 
E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment Challenges)), 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding 
“that the Fourth Amendment does not govern searches conducted abroad by U.S. 
agents”). 
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where the search occurred.97  In addition, judges may need to ac­
commodate security concerns by allowing ex parte presentations on 
the sources and methods that produced information justifying a 
search.98  These changes vindicate the public interest in pursuing 
and deterring terrorists while preserving the accountability that dis­
tinguishes American law.99 
B. Military Commissions 
As President Obama indicated in his May 2009 remarks, mili­
tary commissions are an appropriate and lawful way to try sus­
pected terrorists.100  The Framers were aware of the need for 
military commissions, since they were familiar with General Wash­
ington’s use of a military commission to try the British spy Major 
John Andre during the Revolutionary War.101  The government also 
used military commissions during the Civil War102 and World War 
II.103  Military commissions provide an additional layer of protec­
tion for sensitive information as well as greater flexibility in the in­
97. See id. (holding “that searches of U.S. citizens [abroad] need only satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness”). 
98. Id. at 165-67. 
99. See generally Robert M. Chesney & Jack L. Goldsmith, Terrorism and the 
Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008) 
(arguing that criminal adjudication of terrorism cases is becoming more flexible, while 
other forums such as military commissions are providing more procedural safeguards to 
defendants, leading to common ground); Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 87 (arguing R 
that federal courts fashioning flexible rules should be first resort for prosecution of 
terrorism cases).  Some have argued that to ensure flexibility Congress should establish 
a National Security Court. See GLENN  SULMASY, THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  COURT 
SYSTEM: A NATURAL  EVOLUTION OF  JUSTICE IN AN  AGE OF  TERROR 164-93 (2009); 
Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process Is a Strategic Choice: Legitimacy and 
the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 87, 
110-24 (2008).  However, a National Security Court could institutionalize shortcuts 
around due process, while military commissions and detention under the laws of war 
have the virtue of being temporary measures that would more readily fade into disuse if 
the need diminishes.  For a useful debate, see Amos N. Guiora & John T. Parry, De­
bate, Light at the End of the Pipeline?: Choosing a Forum for Suspected Terrorists, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 356 (2008), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/ 
terrorcourts.pdf. 
100. Obama Remarks, supra note 10.  For a dissenting view, see Gude, supra note R 
62, at 4 (arguing that military commissions provided insufficient procedural safeguards, R 
compared with courts martial). 
101. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 n.9 (1942). See generally Obama Re­
marks, supra note 10 (discussing history of military commissions). R 
102. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Story of Ex Parte Milligan: Military Trials, En­
emy Combatants, and Congressional Authorization, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 
93, 94-96 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
103. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48 (upholding use of military commission to try Ger­
man saboteurs). 
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troduction of evidence and the choice of charges against 
defendants. 
Under the Constitution’s Define and Punish Clause,104 Con­
gress has some leeway in designating crimes punishable by military 
commission.105  Military commissions probably have jurisdiction 
over crimes such as conspiracy.106  Military commissions have often 
tried defendants based on conspiracy charges, and international law 
provides that defendants accused of crimes akin to conspiracy, such 
as participation in a Joint Criminal Enterprise, may be tried in anal­
ogous settings.107  Any other result would allow terrorists to game 
the system and encourage false negatives. 
However, reviewing courts must limit this flexibility to ensure 
that false positives do not proliferate.  Certain allegations, such as 
the provision of material support to the organization, may not fit 
within the rubric of the law of war absent a showing of specific in­
tent to aid in hostilities against the United States or its allies.108  A 
military commission would lack jurisdiction to hear such cases.  A 
commission would also lack jurisdiction over charges involving con­
duct that was not criminal at the time the conduct occurred.109 
Military commissions should also limit the evidence they can 
admit.  A military commission should not admit evidence obtained 
by coercion.  As Anglo-American courts have held for over two 
hundred years, evidence obtained in this manner is unreliable.110 
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress power “[t]o define and pun­
ish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations”). 
105. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 323, 335 (2001) (suggesting that courts will likely accord substantial deference 
to Congress’s determinations regarding offenses against international law). 
106. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 598-601 (2006) (plurality opinion) (as­
serting that the law of war did not encompass conspiracy).  Moreover, Hamdan con­
cerned a unilateral executive order, not a statute enacted by Congress pursuant to its 
authority under the Define and Punish Clause. Id. at 601. 
107. Id. at 611 n.40; cf. Mark A. Drumbl, The Expressive Value of Prosecuting 
and Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan, the Geneva Conventions, and International Criminal 
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1172 (2007) (arguing that conspiracy prosecutions 
may serve expressive goals under the law of war). 
108. One bill currently under consideration in Congress designates material sup­
port of the organization as a war crime, along with material support of hostilities. See 
H.R. REP. NO. 111-288, § 1802, at 423 (2009) (Conf. Rep.).  The broader definition is 
problematic under the law of war, even given Congress’s leeway under the Define and 
Punish Clause. 
109. See Stephen I. Vladeck, On Jurisdictional Elephants and Kangaroo Courts, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 172, 180 (2008).  Whether prohibitions in civilian crimi­
nal law or the common law of war would provide adequate notice to a defendant 
charged before a military commission is a matter beyond the scope of this Article. 
110. See R. v. Warickshall, (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-36 (K.B.). 
363 
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Admitting such evidence would raise the risk of false positives to 
intolerable levels as well as encourage deterioration in the institu­
tional culture and controls that have long been the pride of the 
American military. 
C. Detention Under the Law of War 
Detention of civilians who have assisted combatants is permis­
sible under the law of war.  However, here too, limits are necessary 
to avoid providing a “blank check” to the government.111  Fortu­
nately, courts have already done useful work in striking this 
balance.112 
To avert false negatives, the administration should adopt the 
reasoning in Hamlily v. Obama.113  The Hamlily court found that 
the law of war, including the Geneva Convention, supported deten­
tion of putative civilians who were “part of” Al-Qaeda or the 
Taliban.114  The court rightly found authority for such detention in 
Congress’s Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 
passed shortly after September 11.115  International law also has im­
plied that a government involved in a conflict with a terrorist group 
can detain putative civilians who function as part of the group’s in­
frastructure, either giving or receiving commands and undertaking 
obligations to the group in excess of duties undertaken by an ordi­
nary civilian worker in a conventional state.116  An individual who 
111. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). See generally Matthew C. 
Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Ter­
rorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2008) (offering criteria and procedures for 
detention). 
112. See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 78 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that 
the President may detain persons who “planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks . . . and persons who harbored those responsible for those attacks”). 
113. Id. at 70-76. 
114. Id. at 75; cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authori­
zation and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2109-15 (2005) (discussing 
interaction of law of war and Congress’s post-September 11 Authorization for the Use 
of Military Force); Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 
AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 53-55 (2009) (discussing authority under law of war for detention of 
civilians indirectly assisting combatant groups). 
115. See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (noting that “[t]he AUMF authorizes the 
President to ‘use all necessary and appropriate force against those . . . organizations . . . 
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided’ the September 11 attacks” 
(quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 
224, 224 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)))). 
116. See id. at 73-75 (citing, inter alia, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con­
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Interna­
tional Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Part IV, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609). 
Protocol II protects “civilians” from targeting by a government engaged in a conflict 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-2\WNE203.txt unknown Seq: 26 24-MAY-10 13:38 
364 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:339 
knowingly transports weapons for Al-Qaeda, for example, can be 
detained.117  However, the provision of such material support is 
merely evidence that the individual is part of Al-Qaeda, not an in­
dependent substantive basis for detention.118 
While these distinctions can be difficult, determining the ad­
missibility of evidence is even more complex.  Courts should re­
quire that the government establish the accuracy and reliability of 
its evidentiary submissions instead of receiving a presumption of 
accuracy.119  The court should consider consistency with other evi­
dence, circumstances surrounding the obtaining of such evidence, 
and accuracy of translation.  Accusations by a witness previously 
judged unreliable may be discounted if also based on hearsay, such 
as conversations by others about the detainee.120  Here, as else­
where, informants, including jail snitches, should be regarded with 
some skepticism.121  These witnesses often have something to sell 
and an agenda of their own to vindicate, including striking a better 
deal for themselves.  This prospect, like the prospect of ending a 
coercive interrogation, may lead the subject to say what his captors 
wish to hear. 
However, courts also need to appreciate that detention under 
the laws of war has historically been a matter of status and broad 
indicia of conduct.  For example, to detain an individual as a pris­
oner of war, a government needs to show that the detainee has pre­
pared for or participated in hostilities.  Once the government 
establishes this, detention is authorized.122  The government does 
not need to show that a soldier of an enemy power has fired his 
rifle—capture of the individual in a uniform of an enemy power 
would be sufficient.  It should be sufficient for the government to 
with a terrorist or rebel group.  As the Hamlily court indicated, such protection would 
be unnecessary if international humanitarian law classified all members of terrorist or 
armed rebel groups as civilians. See id. at 73-74. 
117. Id. at 75. 
118. Id. at 75-77. 
119. See Ali Ahmed v. Obama, 614 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2009). 
120. Id. at 57. 
121. See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69 (1995) (dis­
cussing cooperation and the lawyer’s professional responsibility as an officer of the 
court); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth 
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 926-31 (1999) (outlining systemic 
factors that encourage dishonesty among cooperators). 
122. See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 74.  “The laws of war traditionally emphasize 
pure associational status as the primary ground for detention; individual conduct pro­
vides only a secondary, alternative predicate.” Id. (quoting Chesney & Goldsmith, 
supra note 99, at 1084) (internal quotation marks omitted). R 
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show that an individual has participated in training at a terrorist 
camp.  Probative evidence of membership should include the de­
tainee’s lack of a passport, which often dovetails with Al-Qaeda op­
eratives’ tactics to conceal time spent in Afghanistan or Pakistan.123 
Further concrete or specific evidence should not be necessary for 
detention under the laws of war; to require such evidence confuses 
the evidentiary showing in this context with the more particularized 
context appropriate to criminal trials, where the environment typi­
cally permits more methodical investigation by law-enforcement 
authorities.  Military apprehension involves a conflict between mili­
tary goals and law-enforcement goals; courts should not impose 
pressure on the military to neglect the former in favor of the 
latter.124 
D. Accuracy and Exit: The Question of Bagram 
Accuracy at Guantanamo means little if the government can 
detain individuals elsewhere based on flimsy evidence.  This would 
allow the government to treat closing Guantanamo as a shell game 
and enjoy public-relations benefits while maintaining the system 
that the Bush administration initiated.125  Accuracy must meet a 
more robust test. 
123. The provision of support should be probative evidence of membership when 
the support is closely related in time, geography, or operational planning to acts of 
violence. 
124. The exigencies of the battlefield should also inform the reach of criminal 
procedure.  Courts should not require that military personnel capturing suspected ter­
rorists provide Miranda warnings. Cf. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1040, 123 Stat. 2190, 2454 (2009) (barring military 
personnel from providing Miranda warnings to captives suspected of terrorist activity). 
Nevertheless, personnel who interrogate a detainee in the course of a criminal investi­
gation may find it prudent to provide Miranda warnings in some form. 
A number of commentators have warned that detention regimes undermine the 
broader view of efficiency espoused by the new administration by risking ongoing alien­
ation of important global audiences. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 60; Deborah R 
Pearlstein, We’re All Experts Now: A Security Case Against Security Detention, 40 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 577 (2009); cf. Gude, supra note 62, at 13 (arguing that detention R 
authority should be limited to individuals captured at or near the battlefield).  On bal­
ance, the authorization for detention under law-of-war doctrine and the need to prevent 
further catastrophic attacks outweigh this concern, assuming that such a regime includes 
procedures to minimize the risk of false positives. Cf. David Cole, supra note 68, at R 
747-50 (arguing for a more circumscribed criteria for detention). 
125. The government may also resort to the targeted killing of terrorist opera­
tives. See William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination: 
The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 679-82 (2003) (discussing interna­
tional and domestic norms governing targeted killing). 
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Fortunately, at least one district court has found this way.  In 
Maqaleh v. Gates, the district court held that habeas corpus ex­
tended to Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, where the United 
States has housed hundreds of detainees, including those brought in 
from other areas.126  The court ruled that detainees apprehended 
outside Afghanistan and rendered there by United States forces 
were on the same footing as Guantanamo detainees.127  The Su­
preme Court had cautioned in Boumediene v. Bush that creating 
habeas-free zones abroad would allow the executive to “contract[ ] 
away” the accountability the Framers built into the separation of 
powers.128  The Obama administration has recently sought to im­
prove procedures at Bagram,129 but it is unclear whether these steps 
will make a material difference without the accountability that 
habeas yields. 
V. SITING APPROACHES 
The principles articulated by President Obama in his May 2009 
address offer a foundation for considering the logistical question of 
how to close Guantanamo.  With proper judicial review, the three-
tiered approach of civilian trials, military trials, and detention under 
the laws of war can address problems of accuracy.  A variety of ap­
proaches are possible to ensure equity and efficiency, as well. 
A. Dispersion Rules 
One common approach to siting difficulties is the use of disper­
sion rules.  These rules promote equity and burden-sharing by 
guarding against overconcentration of facilities.  For example, New 
York’s law for siting group homes for people with mental disabili­
ties requires a finding that a particular site does not currently have 
an overconcentration of such uses.130  The process set up to receive 
arguments about overconcentration and other issues also has the 
same benefit as any other process—it channels discussion into a 
neutral process where people feel that they have been heard.  Just 
126. Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 235 (D.D.C. 2009). 
127. Id. at 220. 
128. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008) (“The test for deter­
mining the scope of [the habeas corpus guarantee in the Suspension Clause] must not 
be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain.”). 
129. See Eric Schmitt, U.S. Will Expand Detainee Review in Afghan Prison, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at A1. 
130. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1)(C) (McKinney 2006); cf. Margu­
lies, supra note 1, at 976-84. R 
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as democracy promotes legitimacy and acceptance by allowing peo­
ple a voice, a process for siting accomplishes this result.  To pro­
mote flexibility, Congress could also provide for waiving the 
dispersion rules in appropriate cases where host communities fash­
ioned workable arrangements with the federal government. 
B. Siting Commission 
Dispersion rules could also be folded into an even more com­
prehensive process involving a siting commission.  Previous admin­
istrations used a commission with some success to address the 
difficult issue of closing military bases.131  A commission can apply 
neutral criteria, including overconcentration.  It can also look at the 
degree of danger a community might fear because of escapes and 
terrorist reprisals.132  Finally, it can consider the steps required to 
minimize these safety issues.  While the base closure model con­
cerned closing sites, not opening them, the issues of equity and the 
public good were largely the same.  Each community benefits from 
a base, which provides employment and a flow of federal dollars, 
while the public as a whole might benefit from closing some of the 
bases to avoid redundancy.  A similar model might work in the de­
tainee siting context.  A commission also provides some political 
cover for legislators—they can point to the process in the same way 
that elected officials can avoid commenting on criminal trials by 
noting that the process is going forward.  Legislators are also free to 
weigh in as part of the process and then can assert credibly that 
they made their cases and the commission decided based on neutral 
criteria. 
C. Site Auctions 
A more controversial approach might be to establish an auc­
tion for detainee sites.  Under an auction approach, a community or 
state could bid to establish a site for a given number of detainees. 
Communities that bid earlier and for higher numbers would receive 
131. See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, About the Com­
mission, http://www.brac.gov/about.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2010); see also Ryan San­
ticola, Encroachment: Where National Security, Land Use, and the Environment Collide, 
10 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 329, 348 n.117 (2005).  One commentator has urged a 
“blue-ribbon panel” that would serve a similar function for transferring detainees to the 
United States. See Mendelson, supra note 60. R 
132. For a useful discussion of fears in the context of siting nuclear waste disposal 
facilities, see Amanda Leiter, The Perils of a Half-Built Bridge: Risk Perception, Shifting 
Majorities, and the Nuclear Power Debate, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 31, 64-66 (2008). 
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benefits from the federal government, including a priority for pub­
lic-works projects and other federal spending.  A cap could limit the 
number of detainees in any one community, thereby promoting eq­
uity goals.  Of course, if NIMBY pressures are strong, finding com­
munities to volunteer may be challenging.  An additional incentive 
to elicit bids might be setting a time deadline, after which all com­
munities would go into the “hopper” for consideration by a com­
mission, or perhaps for random assignment. 
D. Security Impact Statements 
Another alternative that Congress appears to have embraced 
as of October 2009 involves security impact statements for each 
projected transfer.133  The security-impact-statement approach re­
quires that the President provide Congress with an analysis of the 
security consequences of each transfer of a Guantanamo detainee 
to a mainland United States facility.134  The President must con­
sider security issues caused by the transfer.  Furthermore, the Presi­
dent must consult with the governor of each state where a transfer 
is contemplated, in order to optimize planning.  The security impact 
statement process, like similar processes in environmental law, en­
courages government to think methodically about consequences.  It 
also allows legislators and others to point to the process as an indi­
cation that they understand constituents’ concerns.  While some 
questions may emerge about the constitutionality of the impact 
statement and consultation provisions, the President will most 
likely decide that the prudent course is to comply with the legisla­
tion.  Any other course could result in a continuation of the con­
gressional restiveness that hampered placement efforts for the early 
months of the Obama presidency. 
E. Offshore Siting: Guantanamo Redux? 
For certain environmentally beneficial uses, such as wind farms 
and liquid natural gas facilities, planners are looking at alternatives 
such as offshore siting.135  Offshore siting avoids a disparate impact 
on any one community and diffuses the NIMBY syndrome.136 
133. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-84, § 1041, 123 Stat. 2190, 2454 (2009). 
134. Id. 
135. See Kathryn E. Kransdorf, Note, Not on My Coastline: The Jurisdictional 
Battle over the Siting of LNG Import Terminals, 17 FORDHAM  ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 81 
(2005). 
136. See Mendelson, supra note 60. R 
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Guantanamo itself is an offshore facility.  One solution to the 
NIMBY issues hindering Guantanamo’s closure is keeping Guanta­
namo open.  The problem with this alternative is that it represents 
the status quo—Guantanamo is a public relations and human rights 
problem precisely because it is offshore.  This outcome would not 
be a change of the kind that President Obama promised.  The re­
joinder is that Guantanamo is a problem not because of its geo­
graphic location, per se, but because of the legal regime that the 
former administration implemented by virtue of that location.  The 
courts’ imposition of the rule of law on Guantanamo has eased this 
asymmetry in legal regimes.  A detainee camp located at Guanta­
namo could have even more procedural protections for detainees as 
well as a more user-friendly environment for the development of 
appropriate lawyer-client relationships.137  On this view, Guanta­
namo is merely a state of mind, subject to change as legal rules 
promote uniformity and transparency.  Through incentives and 
compensation for states and foreign nations, the government could 
draw down the Guantanamo census to a core of perhaps fifty to 
sixty detainees whom the government cannot release because of 
fears that they will recidivate.  While the placement of these detain­
ees at Guantanamo is not optimal from a symbolic standpoint, it at 
least avoids problems with accuracy that would result from releas­
ing dangerous detainees and the NIMBY problems linked with 
transfer to the United States. 
F. Incentives and Log-Rolling in International Resettlement 
For resettlement internationally, incentives may work better 
than equity-related dispersion rules.  The use of foreign aid to help 
further the national and broader global interest is nothing new. 
The United States used this strategy to help contain the spread of 
Communism in the second half of the last century.138  Using similar 
137. The government imposed significant obstacles to these relationships. See 
Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantanamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1268422; 
Mark Denbeaux & Christina Boyd-Nafstad, The Attorney-Client Relationship in Guan­
tanamo Bay, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 491 (2007); Margulies, supra note 19, at 365. R 
138. Cf. William P. Alford, Exporting “The Pursuit of Happiness,” 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1677, 1693 (2000) (book review) (discussing role of foreign aid in furthering 
democracy). 
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methods to help close Guantanamo will further the cause of global 
counterterrorism today.139 
VI. A BLENDED APPROACH 
An effective approach needs to consider both the content of 
measures related to the closure of Guantanamo and the sequencing 
of such measures.  The administration has moved to put procedures 
in place to promote accuracy, which courts should accept with the 
changes mentioned in the previous part on jurisdiction of military 
commissions, scrutiny of hearsay, and access to habeas at Bagram. 
As President Obama indicated in his May 2009 address, civilian 
criminal prosecutions should be the preferred mode in order to take 
advantage of the additional flexibility signaled by the courts in cases 
like Odeh. 
On the equity front, the administration should immediately ask 
Congress to establish a bipartisan commission to examine issues re­
garding the resettlement of detainees.  If the commission recom­
mends dispersion rules and a waiver system, the administration 
should support this option.  Similarly, the commission should rec­
ommend legislation permitting transfer to a secure United States 
facility of detainees held under the law of war along with a bar on 
release to any United States community of any such detainee.140 
Legislation authorizing transfer of detainees to United States facili­
ties should authorize only the transfer of detainees who have been 
determined by a final order of the federal courts to be members of 
Al-Qaeda.141  Finally, for other nations, the administration should 
provide incentives to encourage resettlement while ensuring that 
receiving countries have adequate security to handle recidivism. 
CONCLUSION 
The challenge of closing Guantanamo entails consideration of 
three perennial values in siting debates: efficiency, equity, and accu­
139. As one key example, the administration must commit itself to strengthening 
the capacity of the Yemeni government to arrest, detain, try, and punish terrorists. See 
Josh Meyer, Yemen Forms New Front in Terror Fight, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at A1. 
140. The courts would likely honor this bar. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 
695-96 (2001) (suggesting that terrorism or other cases that would “leave [an] ‘unpro­
tected spot in the Nation’s armor’” constitute an exception to the general rule that 
government cannot detain aliens if it has no reasonable prospect of deporting them to 
another country (quoting Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 602 (1953))). 
141. Some detainees have declined to seek habeas relief.  In such cases, the Secre­
tary of Defense should certify prior to a transfer to custody within the United States 
that release would endanger national security. 
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racy.  President Obama’s one-year deadline for closing Guanta­
namo reframed efficiency in a salutary manner, considering 
Guantanamo’s role as a symbol that suppressed international coop­
eration with counterterrorism policies.  However, the President and 
his advisors did not anticipate the signal the closure pledge sent to 
Congress.  Congress interpreted the closure pledge as heralding a 
reduced commitment to accuracy in ferreting out false negatives.  It 
also viewed the pledge as privileging conceptions of international 
equity over concern about states taking more than their fair share 
of detainee transfers. 
Hindsight suggests that the new administration should have de­
veloped a comprehensive plan first and arrived at a deadline for 
closing Guantanamo as it implemented the plan.  President 
Obama’s May 2009 address realigned the administration’s signals 
with Congress’s expectations while also signaling the President’s 
commitment to the rule of law.  More needs to be done to control 
the jurisdiction of military commissions, assure the reliability of 
hearsay evidence, and provide habeas to detainees at other sites 
such as Bagram.  Any delays in the closure of Guantanamo are a 
small price to pay for ensuring the appropriate balance of effi­
ciency, equity, and accuracy in detention policy. 
